Turkey's global strategy: Turkey and Iran by Hentov, Elliot
  
Elliot Hentov 
Turkey's global strategy: Turkey and Iran 
 
Report 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Hentov, Elliot (2011) Turkey's global strategy: Turkey and Iran. IDEAS reports - special reports, 
Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR007. LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
London, UK. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43501/ 
 
Originally available from LSE IDEAS 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2012 
 
© 2011 The Author 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
Turkey and Iran
As the neighbouring state most comparable to Turkey in geographic, demographic and socio-economic size, relations with Iran differ from all other neighbourly relations, as 
Iran is considered Turkey’s equal. As such, the relationship is also fi lled with historical legacies 
that have shaped public and elite perceptions. First, there is the legacy stemming from the 
century-old rivalry of the two former empires (Ottoman and Persian) whose competition was 
territorial, political, cultural as well as religious. Furthermore, the parallel decline of imperial 
strength – both in Constantinople and in Tehran - gave rise to a shared struggle against the 
encroachment of outside powers, mainly Russia and the West. The second legacy derives 
from the experience as modern nation-states and is rather amicable. It originates in Turkish 
and Iranian affi nity to modernise in the face of superior enemies, guiding the two countries 
in their transition to modernity. Notably, Reza Shah’s only visit abroad took him to Turkey in 
1934 to inspect his western neighbour’s reforms and social engineering. After World War II, 
the two states were nominal allies of the Western bloc though the institutional arrangement 
– the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) – was effectively dormant. Instead, Iran’s natural 
resource wealth soon enabled the country to eclipse Turkey’s developmental level and Iran’s 
reassertion of infl uence resurrected Turkish memories of a threat from the East. 
RELATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN
This had been the context of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Relations with the Islamic Republic have 
henceforth vacillated between restrained tension and tacit cooperation, usually depending on Iran’s 
foreign policy priorities. Iran’s revolution had initially been welcomed by Turkish leaders due to internal 
political and economic weakness. Yet despite Turkey’s immediate recognition of the Khomeini regime, 
the ideological contrast between the two regimes was stark and grew stronger with the 1980 military 
coup in Turkey. The impending clash was only averted through the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, 
creating incentives for Turkey and Iran to deepen cooperation. Ankara was reeling from an economic 
crisis and the 1980 coup had also left it politically weakened on the international stage. At the same 
time, Turkey proved to be the only viable trade and transport route for Iranians. Government-negotiated 
barter deals – oil for consumer and industrial goods – ensured stable Turkish-Iranian relations free of 
political differences for most of the war. However, Iran’s offensives indirectly created a safe haven for 
the separatist Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) to launch an insurgency inside Turkey based on Iraqi soil. 
Toward the end of the war, Turkey’s military response to the PKK increasingly made it a party to the 
confl ict in support of the objectives of the Baghdad regime. This development and the simultaneous 
collapse in world oil prices diminished the importance of economic ties and Turkish-Iranian relations 
became more fractious. 
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Iran after 1989, post-Iran-Iraq War and post-
Khomeini, was focused on overcoming its 
international isolation, advancing reconstruction 
and retaking a recognised role as part of the regional 
order. In this context, Turkey was neither expected 
to provide assistance nor pose a major obstacle to 
Iranian regional designs. However, the momentous 
changes in the global order with the end of the 
Cold War complicated Turkish-Iranian tensions as 
power shifted decisively toward the US-affi liated 
camp. In addition, Turkey’s initial exuberance 
over reconnecting with its Turkic brethren in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia briefl y elevated Turkey 
to an Iranian national security threat in the early 
1990s. In response, Iran undertook great effort 
to stem Turkish infl uence by backing the PKK as 
well as Islamic fundamentalists inside Turkey to 
destabilise its political system. Tensions reached a 
crescendo in early 1997, due to the rise of political 
Islam inside Turkey and Tehran’s embrace of Turkish 
Islamists, in part contributing to the ‘post-modern 
coup’ in February 1997. This also ushered in a more 
militarised Turkish foreign policy that softened 
after the apparent victory over the PKK in 1998-
1999. Thereafter, lacking any security dimension, 
Turkish-Iranian relations became uneventful and 
centred around energy trade. Turkey’s economic 
crisis in 2000-2001 further subdued relations with 
Iran, preoccupying Turks with internal problems 
and international fi nancial pressures. The political 
reaction to the economic meltdown was the 
November 2002 election that replaced most of 
the Turkish leadership and set the country on a new 
path internally as well as in its foreign relations.
NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS SINCE 2002
While Turkish-Iranian rapprochement began in 
2000, three fundamental parameters of the bilateral 
relationship have been transformed since 2002. 
First, Turkey’s domestic politics underwent profound 
change. The 2002 election of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) heralded a new leadership 
in Ankara. Moreover, this new elite set about altering 
the character of the Turkish state in a manner that 
diminished the military-bureaucratic infl uence and 
with it, the ideological differences between Turkey 
and Iran. In detail, due to a 10% electoral threshold, 
only two parties managed to enter parliament: the 
moderate Islamist AKP with 34.5% of the vote 
and the staunchly Kemalist Republican People’s 
Party (CHP) with 19.5% of the vote. In light of 
the quirks of the electoral system, 45% of the 
electorate remained unrepresented in parliament, 
and the AKP received 363 seats, four short of a two-
thirds majority. This new constellation was akin to 
regime change. Turkish columnist Mehmet Ali Birand 
called it ‘a civil coup’, and the Turkish daily Milliyet 
summed up the seismic shakeup of the elite with 
the football metaphor ‘Red Card’ posted above the 
faces of the political leaders ousted from parliament. 
Viewed from Iran, the previous elite had stood for a 
security-oriented, ossifi ed Kemalist worldview, which 
was deeply hostile to Turkish engagement with the 
Islamic world, particularly Iran. In this regard, Tehran 
struggled to hide its pleasure of the Turkish public’s 
wholesale rejection of the old elite.
Furthermore, the AKP gradually infused Turkish 
foreign policy with a novel worldview of Turkey being 
a central player in its own right, thus emphasising 
greater regional activism and trade-driven foreign 
relations. In this context, the AKP drew on the a 
new foreign policy paradigm in the writings of 
Professor Ahmet Davutoglu that laid out the vision of 
Turkey as a global power at the crossroads between 
East-West and North-South. His worldview was a 
whole-hearted repudiation of the Kemalist ‘bunker 
mentality’, which the AKP also considered linked 
to the perpetuation of elite rule inside the country. 
Indeed, ‘strategic depth’ posits a different worldview 
of how to think about Turkey’s role in the world, 
leveraging the country’s geo-strategic location and 
historical depth. In order to build on these inherent 
assets, Turkey needed to resolve longstanding 
tensions with its regional neighbours, particularly 
Iran, a policy later termed ‘zero problems’. Moreover, 
claiming to form a centre and not simply a peripheral 
member of any axis, Ankara needed to re-balance its 
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relationships. Instead of solely being a junior anchor 
of the Western alliance, Turkey needed to create 
multiple alliances that maximised its operational 
independence and helped to maintain a balance of 
power in its adjacent regions. Davutoglu foresaw 
this approach to be accompanied by substituting 
the ‘security-oriented’ Kemalist outlook with a new 
‘economy-oriented’ foreign policy. Together with the 
AKP discourse of political Islam, this new approach 
has facilitated identifying common ground with Iran 
and strengthened the two countries’ rapprochement 
in the past decade.
  
Second, the strategic environment and Turkey’s 
foreign relations entered a new era due to the US 
invasion of Iraq. Ankara’s rejection of support for 
the invasion and the gradual deterioration of the 
Turkish-US relationship lessened Turkey’s image as a 
US ally in the eyes of Iranians. Before Erdogan had 
formally taken offi ce, the impending US invasion of 
Iraq posed a major foreign policy challenge to the 
AKP government. Despite the generous offer of US 
assistance, elite opinion began to follow the general 
public with rising nationalist sentiment, growing 
skepticism over US motives and memories of the cost 
incurred during the Gulf War in 1991. The discussions 
culminated in the historic parliamentary vote on 
1 March 2003, which denied Turkey as a staging 
ground for US troops. Though many observers termed 
the vote an ‘accident’ or a ‘managerial failure’ by 
Erdogan, others identifi ed it as the beginning of 
a policy of distancing Ankara from US infl uence 
in the region. Whereas this was widely viewed as 
a political catastrophe for the AKP at the time, it 
proved to be a blessing for Turkish-Iranian relations. 
The parliamentary vote was a key turning point in the 
bilateral relationship, as Ankara sensed a profound 
change of attitude from Tehran thereafter. It confi rmed 
Tehran’s initial impression that the election of the 
AKP indeed heralded a new era of independence in 
Turkish foreign policy, one that dared to counter US 
preferences. Moreover, Iran considered the increased 
democratisation of Turkey to be to its benefi t, as it 
has assumed the majority of the Turkish public to be 
sympathetic to their eastern neighbour for religious 
and cultural reasons. 
Moreover, the Iraq War generated a convergence of 
Turkish-Iranian strategic interests for three reasons. 
First, Iran was confronted with large-scale US troop 
deployments on two of its borders, feeling increasingly 
besieged and thus eager to mitigate the US threat. 
Second, US-Turkish relations drastically worsened 
after the 1 March 2003 vote and once US troops 
had occupied Iraq. This was both due to political 
and operational failures as well as to the simple fact 
that the two allies had grossly different objectives in 
post-Saddam Iraq. The growing gap with Washington 
allowed or even induced Ankara to pursue other 
strategies. And third, both Iran and Turkey faced the 
prospect of an independent Kurdish state that would 
pose an irredentist threat to their national borders. 
Moreover, the fall of Saddam’s regime and explicit 
Kurdish support for the US occupation facilitated 
the re-establishment of a safe haven for the PKK 
and the re-start of an insurgency. This was not only 
a challenge to the Turkish state, as the PKK spawned 
or cooperated with the Free Life Party of Kurdistan 
(PJAK), a similar group battling the Iranian state. 
Under these circumstances, increased Turkish-Iranian 
cooperation in Iraq was foreseeable, though it would 
eventually become tempered by competitive impulses 
over how to fi ll the power vacuum in Iraq and the 
Middle East.
On the economic front, Turkey’s rapid economic boom 
was predicated on a trade-driven foreign policy, with 
Turkey boosting exports of manufactured goods 
and specialised services in return for an expanding 
Iranian energy supply. In this context, the AKP 
government has considered it a strategic necessity 
to expand commerce and trade with Iran, regardless 
of Western concerns. As Davutoglu explained in 2007, 
‘here all our allies should take into consideration 
Turkey’s unique position. As a growing economy 
and surrounded by energy resources, Turkey needs 
Iranian energy as a natural extension of its national 
interests. Therefore, Turkey’s energy agreements 
with Iran cannot be dependent upon its relationships 
with other countries.’ Chart 1 illustrates the boom 
in Turkish-Iranian trade, which languished at barely 
over $600 million in 1998. By 2004, trade stood at 
close to $3 billion and exceeded $10 billion in 2008.
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Chart 1: Turkish-Iranian Trade from 2002-2010 in US $ millions.
Chart 2: Turkish-Iranian Trade from 2002-2010 in as a percentage of total Turkish trade.
_______________________
Data from the Turkish Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade, found at www.dtm.gov.tr
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This 15-fold increase over a decade is impressive, 
though not by the standards of overall Turkish trade 
growth, particularly with other regional partners.
Chart 2 shows that as a percentage of Turkish 
exports, Iran roughly doubled its share from 0.73% 
in 1998 to 2.01% in 2009 and ranking as the 14th 
largest export market. As a percentage of Turkish 
imports, imports from Iran actually experienced a 
more rapid increase, rising from 0.94% to 4.06% 
in 2008 before dropping to 2.42% in 2009. Above 
all, the composition of bilateral trade is essential to 
understanding the fl uctuations in recent years. More 
than 80% of Iranian exports are energy exports, either 
natural gas or oil, and therefore the nominal amounts 
are a function of Turkish energy consumption and 
the world market price of energy. In contrast, Turkish 
exports are less volatile as they are concentrated in 
industrial goods and infrastructural services.
In similar fashion to the deterioration in US-Turkish 
relations, Ankara’s ties to the EU worsened after the 
historic October 2005 recognition of Turkey as an 
offi cial EU accession country. Initial euphoria was 
soon followed by a de facto freeze over the Cyprus 
issue, turning Turkish public opinion against the EU 
and slowing Turkey’s drive toward integration with 
the West. Turkey’s primary security concern was 
how Iraq’s instability was reinvigorating the PKK-
led insurgency. In this context, by mid-July 2006, 
the region was preoccupied with the outbreak of 
the Israel-Hizbullah War, widely seen as a pivotal 
moment in the proxy war between Iran and the 
United States. Simultaneously, Iran had provided its 
territory for the Turkish military to prepare an assault 
near Qandil valley. Throughout August, Turkey 
and Iran were jointly bombing alleged PKK / PJAK 
camps inside Iraq, with daily reporting following 
the coordinated Iranian and Turkish operations. The 
details of the exact nature of the operations, such 
as casualty fi gures, are diffi cult to verify. Yet the 
impact on Turkish public opinion was clear: Iran was 
supporting Turkey in its counter-terrorism struggle 
while the US and Europe were either apathetic or 
in collusion with Turkey’s enemies. Since 2006-
2007, most Turkish opinion polls consider the 
United States the greatest threat to Turkey, only 
a minority of Turks endorse EU membership and 
Iran enjoys favorable public opinion. The AKP was 
thus pursuing a foreign policy in accordance with 
public sentiment, as Turkish sympathies for Iran had 
begun to override a history of sectarian and socio-
political differences. 
The third parameter of change was the looming 
confrontation between the West and Iran over 
the latter’s nuclear program. Foremost, it added 
another channel of engagement between Ankara 
and Tehran. Since 2006, through public statements 
of support, Ankara has sought to ingratiate itself 
with the Iranian leadership in an effort to play a 
mediating role in the negotiations over Iran’s 
nuclear program. However, behind closed doors, 
Turkish decision-makers have contemplated how 
to cope with the major security threats posed by 
Iran’s nuclear development. In the short term, the 
nuclear dispute could lead to another regional war 
with Turkey bearing huge economic and political 
costs. And in the long term, Iran’s nuclear status 
would decisively shift the balance of power towards 
Tehran, even if Turkey were not a direct target of 
Iranian hostility. As a result, Ankara has pursued a 
mixed policy aimed at preventing military confl ict as 
well as minimising Iranian hostility, a balancing act 
that has caused friction with its traditional Western 
allies. Nevertheless, for Turkish-Iranian relations, 
the nuclear issue has been a boon to Turkey. It 
has allowed Ankara to elicit Iranian goodwill on 
bilateral issues, notably on opposition to Kurdish 
militancy and the completion of favourable energy 
deals that should enable Turkey to become a 
key energy transit corridor. Lastly, by ultimately 
accepting Turkish mediation on the nuclear fi le and 
by virtue of the Turkish vote against the US in the 
UN Security Council, Iran has reluctantly promoted 
Turkey’s image as the leading regional power.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, the past decade has deeply affected Turkish 
perceptions of Iran. Despite Iran swinging toward 
greater authoritarianism, worsening domestic 
human rights and bellicose rhetoric, Turks no 
longer view Iran as a direct security threat, but 
rather as a regional partner whose victimisation by 
the Western-led international community could be 
detrimental to Turkish interests. In turn, Tehran has 
become more conciliatory, though it has not shed 
its ambivalence about the new role of its Western 
neighbour. Turkey’s newfound independence 
and amity toward Iran have been appreciated. In 
addition, bilateral Turkish-Iranian relations lack any 
potential irritants. If at all, Iran’s reliability as an 
energy supplier and the pricing of its hydrocarbon 
resources are the most challenging issue for 
bilateral ties. While the Iranian market continues to 
offer great opportunities for Turkey’s exporters, the 
relationship lacks the potential glue for any deeper 
political partnership. 
On the other hand, the regional factors that 
have advanced rapprochement between Tehran 
and Ankara have largely run their course. Iranian 
scepticism concerning its Western neighbour 
is rebounding, particularly as Turkey’s status as 
a regional power will increasingly be in direct 
competition to Iranian foreign policy objectives. 
This competition will primarily play out in the 
construction of the new regional order in the Middle 
East. It was already visible in 2010 over the election 
and formation of a government in Iraq. Moreover, 
the two countries have very different hopes and 
fears regarding the Arab uprisings, which have only 
just begun to unfold. ■
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